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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------------
MELVIN H. JENSEN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
MANILA CORPORATION OF THE CHURCH 
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, a corporation sole, 
and JOHN TINKER and GENEVIEVE L. 
TINKER, his wife, 
Defendants-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 14806 
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Manila Corporation of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, appeals from a judgment in favor 
of Respondent relative to the purchase and sale of real estate. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent's complaint for reformation of a Real Estate 
Contract of Sale and Appellant's counterclaim for forfeiture of 
the contract were tried without a jury before the Honorable J. 
Robert Bullock on June 17, 1976, at which time the lower court 
held in favor of Respondent on the issue of reformation of the 
Real Estate Contract of Sale and awarded Respondent attorney's 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fees, but limited Respondent's claim for damages to $1.00 and 
denied Appellant's counterclaim for forfeiture of the contract 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that this Court affirm the judgment 1 
of the trial court and award Respondent attorney's fees incurrec : 
herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
' 
Respondent basically agrees with the Statement of Fact i 
set forth in Appellant's brief, with the following additions: 
Additions: 
1. That prior to the execution of the Real Esta::'. 
Contract of Sale, the Appellant and Respondent executed an 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase wherein the propert:: 
offered and accepted was described as abandoned LDS chapel, 
approximately 1/3 acre of ground, Manila City, Daggett County, 
State of Utah. (D Ex. 4; Finding of Fact Number 3.) 
2. At the time of the execution of the Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, the Appellant was the recor: 
title owner of the property within the fence lines, at least to 
the extent of that property which was not part of the legal 
description subsequently used in the Real Estate Contract of Saii 
(Finding of Fact Number 10; Tr. 74.) 
3. After the execution of the Earnest Money 
d and delive: I·, 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase, the Appellant execute 
-2-
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to the defendant Tinker a quit-claim deed conveying the South 
32 feet of the property within the fence lines, which is the 
property claimed by the Respondent in this suit. (Finding of 
Fact Number ll; P Ex. B, as attached to plaintiff's complaint; 
Tr. 7 3- 7 5 , 8 0 . ) 
4. That prior to the execution of the Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, the Respondent examined the 
real property being offered for sale with a real estate salesman 
who was the agent for the Appellant. (Finding of Fact Number 4; 
Finding of Fact Number 8; Conclusion of Law Number l; Tr. 60-61, 
72.) 
5. The real estate salesman, who was the agent 
for the Appellant, represented to the Respondent that the property 
being offered for sale was the property within the then existing 
fence lines. (Finding of Fact Number 8-9; Tr. 15-18, 63.) This 
is the same parcel of property that the Respondent is now claiming. 
6. That the Respondent relied upon the represent-
ations of the Appellant's agent and took possession of the property 
within the fence lines and has had actual and continuous possess-
ion since that time. (Tr. 70; Finding of Fact Number 14, 16-17.) 
7. That prior to the sale and purchase of the 
property by the parties, the property which the Respondent claims 
was offered for sale was entirely fenced and was used and possessed 
by the Appellant. (Finding of Fact Number 5-7; Tr. 17, 26, 
70-71 ) 
-3-
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l 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PAROL EVIDENCE IS NOT BARRED UNDER THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE AND APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
Appellant relies upon the case of Percival vs. Coope: 
525 P2d 41 (Utah 1974) in support of the proposition that where 
there is no ambiguity in the document conveying property, 
regarding the description of the premises to be conveyed, 
extrinsic evidence cannot be introduced to show that it was the 
intention of the grantor to convey a different tract or that he 
did not intend to convey all of the land described. 
In that case, however, the grantees obtained by 
warranty deed the very land that the grantors had shown to them. 
In fact, the grantee was present when a survey was made to 
determine the location of the property and he expressed satisfacc· 
ion with the land included in the survey. On the other hand, 
the case presently before the Court involves a factual situation 
where the grantee claims that although a particular enclosed 
parcel of real estate was represented as being the subject matte: 
of the sale, the property described in the Real Estate Contract 
of Sale was substantially smaller. Obviously there is a great 
deal of difference between being told what particular parcel of 
real estate is being offered and then receiving that particular 
·s 
parcel, and being told what particular parcel of real estate 1 
being offered and then receiving only a portion of it. 
! 
-4-
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Percival can be distinguished on the basis that there 
was a meeting of the minds, unlike the case presently before the 
Court. 
The objection that the grantees had in the Percival 
case was that the exact parcel of property agreed to was not as 
many acres as represented by the grantor and, therefore, it 
limited the use to which it could be put because of the zoning. 
Any statements regarding parol evidence, as they appear 
in the Percival case, can only be considered in connection with 
the facts of that case. Consequently, it is evident that 
Appellant's reliance on the Percival case is misplaced. 
The controlling case under these facts is Sine vs. 
Harper, 222 P2d 571 (Utah 1950). In that case, this Court stated 
the law regarding parol evidence where the grantee claims the 
description to be of a smaller parcel than represented by the 
grantor. Unlike Percival, this is the factual situation now 
confronted by this Court. In the Sine case, this Court held 
that the contract, as written, did not express the agreement 
reached by the parties and, therefore, a decree was entered re-
forming the instrument. As is true in the case now before the 
Court, an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was 
executed, merely identifying the property as 656-658 West North 
Temple. These numbers had been assigned to a duplex which was 
located on the West 49.5 foot frontage of the premises. Subse-
-5-
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T 
quently, a Uniform Real Estate Contract was executed with the 
same description, together with a legal description which only 
included the 49. 5 foot frontage. The grantee claimed that an 
additional 25. 5 foot piece of frontage was intended to be part 
of the property being purchased. As in our case, the grantee 
took possession of the full parcel, which he claimed should have 
been the description in the contract. On appeal, the Appellant 
assigned as error the fact that the court had admitted into 
evidence that which had a tendency to vary the written terms of 
a contract. In response to that argument, this Court said: 
"If such a contention could be sustained, then the 
equitable theory of reformation of contract would not apply to 
written instruments. The right to reform is given, at least in 
part, so as to make the written instrument express the bargain 
the parties previously orally agreed upon. When a writing is 
reformed, the result is that an oral agreement is by Court decree 
made legally effective, although at variance with the writings. 
which the parties had agreed upon as a memorial of their bargarn 
The principle itself modifies the parol evidence rule." 
The Sine case is not the only authority for this 
proposition. In the case of Janke vs. Beckstead, 332 P2d 933 
(Utah 1958) , the grantees claimed that the deed to them did not 
convey all of the property that the parties had intended. The 
granter contended that the Court erred in admitting parol 
evidence to vary the description in the deed because it contained 
no latent ambiguities and sufficiently identified the land 
conveyed. This Court held that this is not the rule where 
reformation of an instrument is sought on the ground of mutual 
-6-
I 
i 
l Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
L 
mistake or fraud. Citing 45 Am Jur 650, Reformation of 
Instruments, §113, this Court held as follows: 
"It is practically a universal rule that in suits 
to reform written instruments on the ground of fraud or mutual 
mistake, parol evidence is admissible to establish the fact of 
fraud or of a mistake and in what it consisted and to show how 
the writing should be corrected in order to conform to the 
agreement or intention which the parties actually made or had, 
II 
Since parol evidence is admissible in this type of 
situation, this opens the door to several further factual 
disputes which required an evidentiary hearing and justified 
the denial of the Appellant's motion for summary judgment. 
The construction of a contract according to the 
intention of the parties is a question that cannot be decided 
on affidavits under summary judgment procedure where it depends 
on parol evidence. Borrelli vs. J. H. Taylor Construction 
Company, 37 NYS 2d 150. 
The lower court properly ruled wherein they denied 
the Appellant's motion for summary judgment. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS MUTUAL MISTAKE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY 
REFORMATION OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF SALE. 
The evidence set forth in Respondent's Statement of 
Facts is sufficient to justify reformation of the Real Estate 
Contract of Sale. From those facts, it is evident that there was 
mutual mistake, as well as inequitable conduct on the part of 
the Appellant. This is all the law requires before the Respondent 
-7-
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is entitled to a reformation of the Real Estate Contract of 
Sale. Simmons Creek Coal Company vs. Duran, 142 US 147 12 
SCt 239, 335 L Ed 1063. 
The Appellant, in its brief, says that there was no 
mutual mistake for the reasons that the Appellant did not own I 
any more property than that property described in the Real Estate I 
Contract of Sale and neither the corporation, nor any of its 
agents, ever intended to sell more property than was owned by 
Appellant. This is simply not true. The real estate salesman, 
who was the agent for the Appellant, represented to the Responden'.1 
that the Appellant was selling all the property within the then 
existing fence lines. (Finding of Fact 8-9; Tr. 15-18, 63.) 
Representations of a real estate broker to a buyer as to the 
quantity of real estate being offered for sale are binding oo t~ 
agent's principal. This is true even if the broker had no 
authority to make such representations. King vs. H.J. McNeel, 
Inc., 489 P2d 1324 (Idaho 1971). 
Since the representations of the agent are imputed to 
the principal, the Appellant was mis taken when it executed the 
Real Estate Contract of Sale with a description that was less 
than the property offered for sale and accepted. Since the 
Respondent thought the contract description was the property 
within the fence lines, he, too, was mistaken in executing it 
since the description was inaccurate. 
-8-
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In support of the proposition that there was no 
mutual mistake, the Appellant, in its brief, said that the 
corporation sole testified that the realtor was told that a 
survey would have to be taken to establish the property 
boundaries. Not only did the realtor deny that he had been told 
that there would have to be a survey (Tr.83), but even if he 
had been, that does not excuse the fact that neither the 
Appellant nor the realtor told the Respondent that there would 
have to be a survey. On the contrary, the Respondent was told 
that the property was all the property that had been used by the 
Church or, in other words, that within the then existing fence 
lines. 
Furthermore, even if Appellant said there would need 
to be a survey, it could have been interpreted to mean that a 
survey would have to be made to determine the exact legal descript-
ion of the property within the fence lines, 
Appellant's brief says that the corporation sole and 
the real tor both knew that the sale was only 1/3 of an acre. 
What is relevant is not what they knew, even assuming that that 
was the case, but what they represented to the Respondent. 
Finally, Appellant says that it could not have intended 
to sell more property than it owned and, hence, there was no 
mistake by the Appellant as to the property being offered for 
sale. Unfortunately for the Appellant a Vendor cannot ignore 
-9-
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misrepresentations made by itself or its agents as to 
property offered for sale merely on the basis that it was not 
owned by the offeror at the time. If a Vendor does not own 
property which it sells on contract it has the responsibility 
to acquire title before delivery of a deed is due. A Vendor 
can offer for sale property which it does not own at the time 
of the offer. Furthermore, in this case, the Appellant owned 
the property in dispute at the time of the representation that 
it was being offered for sale. (Finding of Fact Number 10, Tr. )11 
Not only is there mutual mistake sufficient to justify 
the equitable remedy of reformation, but there is also mistake 
on the part of the Respondent and inequitable conduct on the part 
of the Appellant. This, too, under the law, is sufficient to 
justify the reformation of the Real Estate Contract of Sale. 
Simmons Creek Coal Company vs. Duran, supra; Percival vs. Cooper, 
supra, at page 43. Certainly it is inequitable to represent throu:I 
an agent that a certain parcel of real estate is being offered for 'I 
I 
sale and then attempt to diminish the offering by executing a Real I 
• I, 
Estate Contract of Sale with a smaller parcel described therein. 
Based upon either mutual mistake or the inequitable conduct of 
Appellant, Respondent is entitled to reformation. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT IS NOT GUILTY OF LACHES, AND, THERE-
FORE, CAN SEEK EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THE FORM OF 
REFORMATION. 
The reason that the Respondent did not file his suit 
-10- l Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for reformation until 1975, even though he had been informed 
by defendant Tinker that there was a dispute as to the South 
32 feet of the property, was because all the parties to this 
lawsuit were trying to get the matter resolved. (Tr. 27-28.) 
This was also the reason why the Respondent was late in making 
his annual payment. (See Exhibits N, P, Q, S, T, U, V, W, and 
X attached to Appellant's fourth request for admission submitted 
to Respondent under date of April 29, 1976, all of which were 
admitted as being correct by the Respondent, to show the 
negotiations between the parties from the time the error in the 
description was discovered until the filing of the lawsuit, and 
also in support of Respondent's failure to make payment timely.) 
Respondent was understandably hesitant to pay the purchase price 
until he was satisfied that he was going to receive a conveyance 
of all the property represented by the real estate salesman. 
(Tr. 27-28; Finding of Fact Number 24.) Respondent's good faith 
is evident from the fact that he tendered the balance due on the 
contract upon filing this suit. (Finding of Fact Number 23.) 
Furthermore, Respondent offered to deposit the balance due on 
the contract into escrow while the dispute was being settled. 
(Tr. 28.) The Appellant cannot spend years negotiating with the 
Respondent over the boundary dispute and then claim that the 
Respondent is guilty of laches. Nor should the Respondent be 
able to misrepresent the property being sold and then expect 
-11-
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timely payments on a smaller parcel until the Respondent 
was guaranteed that he would receive the parcel originally 
offered. Furthermore, since the Respondent had what he wanted, 
namely, the possession of the property, there was no need for 
him to bring suit for reformation until he knew that the 
Appellant had no intention of satisfying him for their misrep-
resentations. The defendant Tinker made no attempt to remove 
the Respondent from the property in dispute and the portion he 
claimed, nor did he file suit against the Respondent. (Tr. 25 .) 1 
Respondent was also paying taxes on the property. In fact, 
the records of the County Recorder show he was being assessed 
for 3/4 of an acre. (Tr. 58; P Ex. 6.) 
Appellant's brief says that Respondent was told by 
defendant Tinker of the boundary dispute in 1968 and yet did not 
mention the problem to the Appellant until 1969. In fact, the 
Respondent's testimony was that he was informed of the dispute 
by the defendant Tinker in either the fall of 1968 or in 1969. 
(Tr. 24.) 
Appellant complains that Respondent knew of the 
boundary dispute prior to investing money in the remodeling of 
the old church. It is difficult to see the significance of that 
investment in terms of this laches argument, since the Appellant 
is not damaged in any sense by the investment of the Respondent. 
To the contrary, the Respondent's complaint for damages was 
denied. 
-12-
l Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant's brief complains that Respondent should 
have made the Appellant aware of Respondent's confusion as to 
the boundaries prior to the signing of the contract on November 
1, 1965. The Respondent was not confused. The Appellant and 
its real estate salesman were, Furthermore, the Respondent was 
unaware of the Appellant's confusion and since the Respondent 
himself was not confused and did not even know of the potential 
dispute, he had no way of bringing this to the attention of 
the Appellant prior to November 1, 1965, as the Appellant claims 
he should. 
Finally, and most importantly, the law does not support 
the claim by the Appellant that the Respondent was guilty of 
laches. 
The only law cited by the Appellant in its brief is 
the general principle that Appellant is free to assert the defense 
of laches since Respondent's claim sounds in equity. Unfortunately 
for the Appellant, there are specific elements to the equitable 
defense of laches which are not present here. 
The other elements to a defense in equity based on 
laches which are pertinent to this case are (1) lack of knowledge 
or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would 
assert the right on which he bases his suit, and (2) injury or 
prejudice to the defendant. 27 Am Jur 2d §162, Equity. Of the 
several elements of laches, the only one set forth by the 
Appellant is the mere lapse of time. Lapse of time, of itself, 
-13-
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is not decisive in determining whether the plaintiff is guilty 
of laches. 27 Am Jur 2d §163, Equity. Lapse of time is only 
one, and, moreover, not ordinarily the controlling or most 
important of the elements to be considered in determining the 
existence and application of laches as a defense in a suit in 
equity. Finucane vs. Hayden, 384 P2d 236 (Idaho 1963). Laches 
must not only consist of delay, but of a delay which works a 
disadvantage to the opposing party. Burningham vs. Burke, 245 , 
P 977 at 983 (Utah 1926). The Appellant, in its brief, makes no I 
allegation of any disadvantage to it due to the delay. This is 
because there was none. Laches requires an inequity founded 
upon some change of conditions or relation of the parties or 
property. Holmberg vs. Armbrecht, 327 US 392, 90 Led 743, 
66 S Ct 582; 27 Am Jur 2d §169, Equity. There has been no such 
change in this case. 
At all times, the Appellant had knowledge that the 
Respondent claimed the right to the entire parcel of real estate 
within the fence lines. This was evident by Respondent's 
possession, improvements and payment of taxes. The improvements i 
consisted of placing a trailer on the parcel of real estate in 
dispute and running sewer and water pipes from the street to the 
trailer. (Tr. 25.) Respondent also renovated the old ward 
house. (Tr. 23.) 
The adjudicated cases proceed on the assumption that 
-14-
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l 
the party to whom laches is imputed has knowledge of his rights, 
and an ample opportunity to establish them in the proper forum; 
that by reason of his delay, the adverse party has a good reason 
to believe that the alleged rights are worthless, or have 
been abandoned; and that, because of the change in condition of 
relations during this period of delay, it would be an injustice 
to the latter to permit him now to assert them. Osincup vs. 
Henthorn, 130 P 652 (Kan 1913), 27 Am Jur 2d §162, 164, Equity. 
Obviously, it would have been unreasonable for the Appellant 
to assume that the alleged rights had been abandoned or even 
that they were worthless . 
Not only must the laches be prejudicial to the adverse 
party, but it must be unexplained. Osincup vs. Henthorn, supra; 
27AmJur 2d §164, Equity. In the case before the Court, the 
delay in bringing suit is explainable and, thus, excusable. The 
Respondent was attempting to resolve the boundary dispute with 
the parties in concern. (Tr. 2 7 -28.) 
Finally, it has been held that as a general principle, 
the lapse of time does not bar the right to property if it is in 
possession or under the control of the claimant. Cleveland Clinic 
Foundation vs. Humphrys, 97 F2d 849, cert den 305 US 628, 83 Led 
403, 59 SCt 93 (CA6 Ohio). Thus, where the suit involves a 
dispute as to the title or ownership of real estate, laches may 
be negatived by the circumstances that the complainant has been 
in undisturbed possession of the property. Brainard vs. Buck, 
-15-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
184 US 99, 46 L ed 449, 22 S Ct 458, 27 Am Jur 2d §165, Equity 
A party in possession of land who resorts to a Court of equity 
to settle a question of title is not chargeable with laches no 
matter how long the delay. First National Bank vs. Mclntosch, 
79 So 121 (Ala) . 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONVEY THE 
PROPERTY THAT IT AGREED TO SELL TO THE 
RESPONDENT BY WARRANTY DEED, RATHER THAN 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED. 
I 
The Real Estate Contract of Sale executed by Appellan: 
and Respondent provides as follows in paragraph 13: 
"Seller, ... agrees to execute and deliver to the 
buyer ... a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title 
to the above described premises, free and clear of all encumbran,, 
... and to furnish at his expense a Policy of Title Insurance in 
the amount of the purchase price ... " 
Once the legal description of the real property being 
sold to the Respondent is reformed, the obligation of the 
Appellant to convey by warranty deed and to insure becomes an 
obligation upon the property described in the reformed instrumer.: 
Appellant's request that it only be required to convey the 
property in the original description by warranty deed and that it 
be allowed to convey the balance of the property by quit-claim 
deed is a request that, in effect, would reverse the effect of 
the ruling of the trial court and would mean that the Respondent 
has accomplished nothing by this lawsuit. Since it was the 
Appellant's own act in quit-claiming the South 32 feet to defendr 
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Tinker after entering into the Earnest Money contract with the 
Respondent and since the lower court has held that the defendant 
Tinker was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice 
and that his interest in the property in question is inferior to 
the Respondent's, it is not an unfair and improper burden upon 
the Appellant to be required to convey all the property offered 
by warranty deed. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate 
that any other party besides defendant Tinker, other than the 
Respondent, claims any interest in the old church site. Defendant 
Tinker has not appealed the decision of the lower court. For 
these reasons, fairness and justice should require the Appellant 
to convey the entire parcel offered to the Respondent and to do 
it by warranty deed and to insure it as required by the Real 
Estate Contract of Sale. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Appellant, in its brief, claims that Respondent is not 
entitled to attorney's fees. The reason given by the Appellant 
is that Respondent failed to make timely payment of the contract 
payment. It is difficult to see what this has to do with 
Respondent's claim for attorney's fees. Respondent's claim is 
based upon the Real Estate Contract of Sale, which provides for 
attorney's fees in this situation. Furthermore, during the trial, 
both Appellant and Respondent stipulated that the successful 
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litigant would be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee of 
$1,000.00. (Tr. 85.) 
Not only should the award of $1, 000. 00 attorney's feei 
to the Respondent be affirmed, but the Respondent should be 
entitled to the additional attorney's fees incurred in defendin: 
this appeal. It is in the discretion of this Court to increase 
as well as affirm, the award of attorney's fees made by the 
lower court. Swain vs. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment 
Company, 279 P2d 709 (Utah 1955). Respondent's attorney's fees! 
incurred to date, solely in connection with this appeal, are 
$750.00. It is estimated that after oral argument and any other 
legal work required by this case, that Respondent's attorney's 
fees for this appeal will be approximately $1,000.00. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A FORFEITURE OF 
THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF SALE. 
Not only was the Respondent justified in not making 
timely payments because of the dispute, which has already been 
discussed, but, furthermore, the Appellant cannot be heard to 
complain regarding late payments where it has accepted them. Th: 
acceptance constitutes a waiver of any objections. Swain vs. 
Salt Lake Real Estate and Invesment Company, supra. 
Furthermore, this Court has previously held that a 
liquidated damage provision is unenforceable if not in accord 
· h · d d · Spencer vs . Perki· ns, 243 PZd wit equity an goo conscience. _ 
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446 (Utah 1952). In that case, this Court held that there 
must be a reasonable forecast of damages which must also be 
reasonable in amount before there can be a forfeiture and the 
buyer must be given credit for improvements to the premises. 
It could hardly be said that a forfeiture of the contract at this 
point, after the Respondent has paid approximately $6,000.00 of 
the $7,000.00 purchase price and has made valuable improvements, 
would be equitable. In the case of Croft vs. Jensen, 40 P2d 198 
(Utah 1935), this Court held that where all but $200.00 of a 
$6,500.00 purchase price had been paid, the Seller was _not en-
titled to a forfeiture and the buyer was to be allowed to pay 
the last payment with interest and to be given clear title to 
the property. 
Even if the facts of this case justified a forfeiture, 
the Appellant never declared such a forfeiture by any notice 
served upon the Respondent. The notice served upon the 
Respondent, which the Appellant claims terminated the contract, 
(see Exhibit B, Appellant's Request for Admission Number 2 under 
date of April 29, 1976), says as follows: 
"You and each of you will take notice that on the 20th 
day of June, 1975 notice was served upon you forfeiting your 
interest in the U~iform Real Estate Contract referred to in said 
notice for failure to make payments as set forth in said notice 
and you and each of you under the terms of said contract and 
notice of June 20 1975' have become and now are the tenants at 
will of Manila Co~poration of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints and as such, you and each of you are hereby 
required to vacate the premises ... " 
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The notice referred to under date of June 18, 1975, 
and served upon the Respondent June 20, 1975, did not forfeit 
the contract, nor could it have until Respondent was given an 
opportunity to cure the delinquency, if such was required of hie 
It merely says that the contract will be forfeited if the 
delinquency is not cured. Thus, there never was a forfeiture, 
even assuming arguendo that Appellant was entitled to such. 
Thus, not only is forfeiture an unreasonable and improper remedy 
under the facts of this case, but it never has even been declarec 
CONCLUSION 
The ruling of the trial court should be affirmed for 
the reasons that have been given. An evidentiary hearing was 
necessitated due to the admissibility of parol evidence. Upon 
the admission of. parol evidence, it became evident that there 
was mutual mistake, as well as mistake upon the part of the 
Respondent and inequitable conduct on the part of the Appellant. 
This is primarily for the reason that the Appellant's agent 
represented to the Respondent that all of the old church site 
and all of the property within the then existing fence lines 
was being offered for sale. Respondent relied upon this repre-
sentation and, therefore, agreed to purchase that parcel of 
property. From the authorities cited in this brief, it is 
apparent that the Respondent was not guilty of laches. Finally, 
it is also apparent that forfeiture is not proper under these 
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circumstances. 
Since the Appellant represented that a certain parcel 
of real estate was being offered for sale and agreed to insure 
title to it and convey it by warranty deed, it should now become 
their duty to do so and to pay the Respondent for the attorney's 
fees he has incurred in the trail of this matter, as well as 
the appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
' ~I ld c3_ gllif L 
David B. Boyce 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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